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THE SYNTHETICITY OF TIME 
Comments on Fang's Critique of Divine Computers 
 
 In a recent article in this journal [Phil. Math., II, v.4 (1989), n.2, pp.?- ?] J. Fang 
argues that we must not be fooled by A.J. Ayer (God rest his soul!) and his cohorts into 
believing that mathematical knowledge has an analytic a priori status.  Even computers, 
he reminds us, take some amount of time to perform their calculations.  The simplicity 
of Kant's infamous example of a mathematical proposition (7+5=12) is "partly to blame" 
for "mislead[ing] scholars in the direction of neglecting the temporal element"; yet a brief 
instant of time is required to grasp even this simple truth.  If Kant were alive today, "and 
if he had had a little more mathematical savvy", Fang explains, he could have used the 
latest example of the largest prime number (391,581 x 2 216,193 - 1) as a better example 
of the "synthetic a priori" character of mathematics.  The reason Fang is so intent upon 
emphasizing the temporal character of mathematics is that he wishes to avoid "the 
uncritical mixing of ... a theology and a philosophy of mathematics."  For "in the light of 
the Computer Age today:  finitism is king!"  Although Kant's aim was explicitly "to 
study the 'human' ... faculty", Fang claims that even he did not adequatley emphasize "the 
clearly and concretely distinguishable line of demarcation between the human and divine 
faculties." 
 Fang's basic point, that mathematics takes time because it is a "human, all too 
human" discipline, is well made.  However, there are several problems with the details 
of his argument which ought to be pointed out.  First, the alternative he suggests to 
Kant's simple equation is not actually a proposition at all, but a calculation; so it cannot 
be used to demonstrate the synthetic a priori character of mathematical propositions.  
Fang would defend himself, no doubt, by noting that the solution to the calculation is 
65,087 digits long, so it would have taken a large chunk of that issue just to write the 
calculation in the form of an equation (to say nothing of the typesetting expense!). 
                                    
Nevertheless, if he wished to use it as an example of a mathematical proposition, he 
should at least have included "= ..." after the calculation itself.  Or, alternatively, he 
could have written it as: 
 
 391,581 x 2216,193 - 1 = (a prime number with 65,087 digits). 
 
 The second problem is more substantial.  Fang assumes throughout his article 
that in order to demonstrate the synthetic a priori status of mathematical propositions, all 
he has to do is to show that it takes time to carry out the calculations they involve.  (For 
example, in note 28 he mentions someone who spent twenty years making a series of 
calculations which turned out to be erroneous, and suggests that this is evidedence against 
the analytic a priority of mathematics.)  Presumably, this is because he thinks that 
analytic truths can be known immediately and that almost everyone agrees that 
mathematical calculation is a priori [see e.g. his notes 26 and 28].  However, such 
assumptions ignore the fact that the "actual process" of discovering or learning to 
understand analytic truths, considered as an empirical activity, takes time just as much as 
does the process of discovering or learning to understand any sythetic truth.  (Kant 
himself suggests this when he says [in Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. Kemp Smith, p.B15] 
"I may analyse my concept of such a possible sum as long as I please...".)  However, the 
syntheticity in question for such temporal matters is entirely a posteriori.  In other words, 
any time we look at a real, "lived experience" in this way, with a view towards 
highlighting its temporal nature, we are adopting the empirical perspective, the result of 
which is always to aim at achieving synthetic a posteriori truth.  Time itself is synthetic 
a priori, according to Kant, not particular times; hence, everything else which is also 
synthetic a priori must obviously be in some sense atemporal (i.e., the justification for its 
truth must come from a source other than the particular experiences we have in time and 
space).  And this means the temporal character of all mathematical calculations is 
                                        3 
irrelevant to the debate as to whether the a priority of mathematics is synthetic or analytic. 
 The third problem is directly related to the second.  Because he does not locate 
the synthetic a priori in its proper (transcendental, and thus atemporal) frame of reference, 
he underestimates the extent to which Kant was intentionally distinguishing between the 
human and divine perspectives (as opposed to simply describing the former).  Indeed, 
the "synthetic a priori" is itself intended by Kant to define the boundary line between the 
human (the immanent) and the divine (the transcendent).  Defining this boundary line 
and its implications was the primary task of Kant's entire Critical philosophy.  In order 
to show conclusively (in Kantian terms) that computers are human, rather than divine 
machines, it is indeed important to demonstrate that they require time (and space) as a 
kind of "synthetic a priori" condition for the possibility of their operation.  But this 
alone is not sufficient.  A full proof would require a further demonstration that the 
principles upon which their functioning depends correspond directly to those necessary 
for the possibility of human knowledge.  (An example of such a parallel would be to 
demonstrate how algorithms do for the computer what Kant says "schematism" does for 
human understanding.) 
 Finally, there remains the question as to whether Kant was right in assigning a 
synthetic a priori status to propositions such as 7+5=12, as Fang clearly wishes us to 
believe he is.  However, as I have presented my views on this matter in sufficient detail 
elsewhere [see my article, "A Priori Knowledge in Perspective:  (2) Naming, Necessity 
and the Analytic A Posteriori", The Review of Metaphysics 41.2 (Dec. 1987), pp.273-
276,279-282], I will conclude here merely by stating that if we wish to regard a particular 
mathematical proposition as having a synthetic a priori status, we ought to go about 
demonstrating this not by arguing that the mathematical calculation in question takes time 
to perform as an empirical task, but rather that it is in some sense necessary for the very 
possibility of the mathematical aspect of human experience. 
